State v. Fitzpatrick

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE

STATE OF ARIZONA, Appellee,

v.

CHARLES HOWARD FITZPATRICK, JR., Appellant.

No. 1 CA-CR 24-0359
FILED 07-31-2025

Appeal from the Superior Court in Yavapai County
No. S1300CR202380051
The Honorable Debra R. Phelan, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Huss Law, PLLC, Tempe
By Jeremy L. Huss
Counsel for Appellant

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Phoenix
By Alice Jones
Counsel for Appellee
 STATE v. FITZPATRICK
Decision of the Court

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Michael J. Brown delivered the decision of the Court, in which
Presiding Judge Anni Hill Foster and Judge Paul J. McMurdie joined.

B R O W N, Judge:

¶1 This appeal is presented to us pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), and State v. Leon, 104 Ariz. 297 (1969). Defense counsel
has searched the record on appeal and advised us there are no meritorious
grounds for reversal. Defendant Charles Howard Fitzpatrick, Jr. was given
the opportunity to file a supplemental brief, but he did not do so. Our
obligation is (1) to ascertain whether defense counsel has “conscientiously
performed” their duty to review the record for arguable issues, and (2) to
conduct our own review of the record for reversible error. See State v. Clark, 196 Ariz. 530, 537, ¶ 30 (App. 1999).

¶2 In January 2023, a police officer performed a traffic stop after
noticing the car Fitzpatrick was driving had a cracked windshield. When
the officer asked Fitzpatrick if there were weapons in the car, Fitzpatrick
said he had knives. The officer eventually asked if he could look at the
weapons, and Fitzpatrick handed him four knives. The officer then
inquired whether Fitzpatrick had been to prison, and Fitzpatrick seemed to
nod affirmatively. When the officer asked Fitzpatrick if his rights had been
restored, Fitzpatrick replied that he could possess the knives if they were
considered “pocketknives.”

¶3 As pertinent here, the State indicted Fitzpatrick on two counts
of misconduct involving weapons, a class 4 felony, in violation of A.R.S.
§ 13-3102(A)(4), for knowingly possessing a “buck knife with a ten-inch
blade” and a “shank with a three and a half-inch blade/metal shank” while
he was a “prohibited possessor.” At a pretrial conference, Fitzpatrick’s
appointed counsel told the court that Fitzpatrick wanted to represent
himself. After conducting a colloquy, the court determined that Fitzpatrick
knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his right to counsel. The
court then ordered Fitzpatrick’s appointed counsel to serve as advisory
counsel.

¶4 Fitzpatrick was present at the final pretrial conference, held
just before jury selection. After a brief recess, the court noted that

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 STATE v. FITZPATRICK
Decision of the Court

Fitzpatrick was not present. A few minutes later, the court explained that
court security confirmed Fitzpatrick had left the courthouse. The court then
determined his presence was waived because he was voluntarily absent
from trial. Following jury selection, the jurors were dismissed for the day,
and the court issued a warrant for Fitzpatrick’s arrest.

¶5 Fitzpatrick was not present the following day at the beginning
of the second day of trial. Despite alerting the court’s staff multiple times
he was on his way, he did not arrive until after the State had presented its
opening statement and conducted direct examination of its first witness,
even though the court had waited at least 30 minutes for Fitzpatrick to
arrive. While the State was examining its second witness, Fitzpatrick
arrived. The court told him he was voluntarily absent the previous day and
summarized what had transpired in his absence. The court quashed
Fitzpatrick’s warrant and he continued to represent himself, with advisory
counsel.

¶6 After the lunch break, the trial court attempted to determine
whether Fitzpatrick would present any evidence. He asked the court if he
could file his “notice of default” and leave, and the court explained what
could happen if he left. After further discussion, Fitzpatrick decided to
leave, and the court determined he was voluntarily absent from the
proceedings. The jury found Fitzpatrick guilty on both counts. The court
later sentenced Fitzpatrick to mitigated, concurrent prison terms of six
years for each count, with 69 days of presentence incarceration credit.

¶7 After a thorough review of the record, we find no arguable
issues for reversal. Clark, 196 Ariz. at 541, ¶ 50. The record reflects
Fitzpatrick was represented by counsel at all critical stages of the
proceedings against him until he waived his right to counsel. Fitzpatrick
was voluntarily absent from significant portions of the trial. See Ariz. R.
Crim. P. 9.1; see also State v. Love, 147 Ariz. 567, 570 (App. 1985) (“The
constitutionally protected right to be present at all critical stages of
trial . . . may be waived if the defendant voluntarily absents himself at
trial.”).

¶8 To meet its burden of proof, the State was required to
establish that Fitzpatrick possessed deadly weapons and that he was a
prohibited possessor. A.R.S. § 13-3102(A)(4). A “deadly weapon” is
“anything that is designed for lethal use,” including a firearm. A.R.S.
§ 13-3101(A)(1). A prohibited possessor is “any person . . . [w]ho has been
convicted . . . of a felony. . . and whose civil right to possess or carry a
firearm has not been restored.” A.R.S. § 13-3101(A)(7)(b).

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 STATE v. FITZPATRICK
Decision of the Court

¶9 The State presented testimony and evidence showing that
Fitzpatrick had prior felony convictions and that his rights had not been
restored. A law enforcement officer testified about the training and
experience he had in dealing with knives, noting that “one of the main ideas
they give you instructionally with knives is that they are lethal.” The officer
explained that a knife kills a person by penetrating the “vital parts of [the]
body.” Referencing the buck knife, he testified it was a “Rambo-style knife”
like “we see in the movies,” and it had the “features that are common in
fighting knives.” Describing the shank, the officer testified it was originally
a file but had been “filed down” to a “sharp point” that “[c]ould be used to
stab” and “easily penetrate the neck area.”

¶10 The evidence supports the convictions, and the sentences
imposed fall within the range permitted by law. As far as the record
reveals, these proceedings were conducted in compliance with the Arizona
Rules of Criminal Procedure and Fitzpatrick’s constitutional and statutory
rights.

¶11 We affirm Fitzpatrick’s convictions and sentences. Unless
defense counsel finds an issue that may be appropriately submitted to the
Arizona Supreme Court, his obligations are fulfilled once he informs
Fitzpatrick of the outcome of this appeal and his future options. See State v.
Shattuck, 140 Ariz. 582, 584–85 (1984). Fitzpatrick may file either a pro se
motion for reconsideration or a petition for review within 30 days of the
date of this decision. If he files a timely motion for reconsideration, he has
15 days after that motion is decided to file a petition for review. See Ariz.
R. Crim. P. 31.21.

MATTHEW J. MARTIN • Clerk of the Court
FILED: JR

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